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I. Introduction
The neoclassical theory of growth, pioneered by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956),
has long been regarded as unsatisfactory because of its steady-state implications. In
models where growth is driven solely by capital accumulation, and where there are
sufficiently diminishing returns to capital per worker, continued long-run growth is
impossible in per capita terms. This is thought to be particularly inappropriate in an
international context, where experience seems to suggest that countries differ
systematically in their abilities to sustain long-run per capita growth. Thus neoclassical
growth theory, and especially its application to models of international trade, fell into
disfavor after a flurry of activity in the late sixties and early seventies, and was widely
regarded as a dead-end theoretical undertaking.1
More recently, Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) have revived the growth theory of
a closed economy by incorporating into their models aspects of economies of scale. This
turns out to permit countries to sustain per capita growth even in the long run, and indeed
it allows the long run growth rate of a country to depend endogenously on its saving
behavior. Other authors, most notably Grossman and Helpman in a series of papers, have
picked up this theme and applied it in an international context.2 In their models, growth
rates not only are endogenous, but they can differ across countries and be influenced by
policy, including trade policy. This is an exciting development, not only because it revives
an undeniably important but previously stagnant area of economic inquiry, but also
because it may, at long last, permit economic theory to contribute to the debate on the link
between liberal trade and economic development.
In this paper, however, I wish to return briefly to the neoclassical model, in order
to suggest that it was not, at least in an international context, quite as deficient as it
iSee Findlay (1984) and Smith (1984) for surveys of this traditional literature
on trade and growth.
2See Grossman and Helpman (1989a, 1989b, 1989c). Helpman (1988) has
provided an excellent and intuitive introduction to this literature.
1
2
seemed. By allowing for both the international mobility of capital as well as differences
across countries in their rates of population growth-what I call diverging populations-I
will show that sustained per capita growth is possible after all for some countries, and that
the growth rate of such a country does depend on its saving behavior. Thus while the
introduction of economies of scale into growth models may well be extremely important in
its own right, it is not a necessary condition for achieving these two desirable theoretical
outcomes.
In addition, my model displays a property that is familiar in another context from
the early growth literature but that has received little attention of late. In the manner of
the capitalist class in the two-class Pasinetti (1962) growth model, my country with the
slower population growth rate can, if it saves sufficiently, come to dominate the
determination of the world return to capital and thus the world growth path. In achieving
this result, that country comes to own a significant share of world capital, even though its
share of world population becomes negligible. This therefore has important and perhaps
disturbing implications for the long run distribution of world income and wealth.
All of this depends crucially, as will become clear, on the assumption that
population growth rates differ across countries. This possibility has been neglected in the
international growth literature, both old and new, not because it is unlikely to arise in the,
real world, but because it has been considered theoretically uninteresting.3 It is argued
that the high-population-growth country, which for convenience I will call South,4 will
become infinitely large relative to the low-population-growth country, which I will call
3The surveys by Findlay (1984) and Smith (1984), for example, make no
mention of the possibility that countries may differ in their population growth rates.
Khang and Kemp (1973) do construct a two-country model in which population growth
rates may differ, and their model in addition allows for two sectors and a variety of
savings assumptions. Therefore the model of the present paper is really a special case of
theirs. However, Khang and Kemp do not proceed very far with the solution to their
model, and in particular they do not derive any of the major results that are derived here.
4The labels North and South are used in this paper purely for ease of exposition.
The model is not a "North-South" model in the sense, say, of Findlay (1984).
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North, and South will therefore behave ultimately like a closed economy. North, on the
other hand, will become so small relative to South as to be unable to affect its terms of
trade, and it will therefore behave like the small open economy whose growth has been
analyzed extensively in the early literature.5 This argument is valid, however, only if
international capital flows are excluded from the model.6 If capital flows are allowed,
then the fact that North's labor force becomes negligible relative to South's does not
necessarily imply that it also comes to own a negligible share of world capital.
The reason for this, as well as an indication of the way my model will behave,
may be found in the literature on two-class growth models that has grown on the
foundation laid by Pasinetti (1962). Pasinetti's model included, in a closed economy, a
class of pure capitalists who earned no labor income but instead derived their entire income
from capital. Likewise in my model, North's share in world labor income must eventually
be zero because of its low population growth rate. North therefore becomes analogous to
Pasinetti's capitalist class and may, like the capitalists, continue indefinitely to own a
positive share of world capital.
5Oniki and Uzawa (1965) handled only the case of identical population growth
rates, claiming (p. 16) that "the general case of constant but different rates of population
growth is handled without much difficulty." Bardhan (1966, p. 39) disputed this claim on
the grounds that "growth equilibrium does not exist" unless population growth rates are
equal, as he had proved in Bardhan (1965). Since Bardhan defined growth equilibrium as
having the property that all variables, including exports and imports, grow at the same
rate as population, his claim was quite correct. However, it misses the point that the
model does possess a well-defined asymptotic solution in which quantities traded grow at a
rate equal to the smaller of the two population growth rates and thus become negligible
relative to population in the faster growing country. Kemp (1969, p. 226) seems to have
been the first to recognize explicitly this tendency for a two-country growth model to
resolve itself into the polar cases of small open and large closed economies.
6There are no international capital flows in the models cited in the preceding
footnote. Kemp (1969, chap. 11) also looked at a model with international investment, but
in that model he assumed from the outset that population growth rates were identical.
Other treatments of growth and trade in a small open economy, such as Johnson (1971),
Vanek (1971), and Deardorff (1974) have also excluded capital flows. Buiter (1981) looked
at capital flows in a two-country overlapping-generations model but again assumed that
population growth rates were identical.
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This result depends, as Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) pointed out, on a
sufficiently large propensity to save by the capitalist class.7 Without that, the
capitalists' share of total capital becomes negligible, and in a closed economy they may be
disregarded. In my model this means that North does become small, in terms of its shares
of both labor and capital. It is still worth studying, however, since the growth behavior of
a small open economy with mobile capital turns out to be markedly different from that of
the small open economy with immobile capital that has previously been studied.
Several conclusions about the behavior of my two-country model may be obtained
directly from the two-class literature. The most important of these has come to be called
the Pasinetti Paradox, which states that the steady-state return to capital equals the ratio
of the population growth rate to the savings propensity of the capitalist class alone. It is
therefore independent of the savings behavior of the workers. In my two country model
this means that the return to capital depends, in a steady state, on the larger of the two
population growth rates and on the savings propensity of North, but it is independent of
savings in South.
Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) noted that this result holds only if the
capitalists save enough to maintain their ownership of a positive share of total capital. In
the dual case of low capitalist savings, they obtain the similar but less remarkable result
that the steady-state average product of capital equals the ratio of the population growth
rate to the worker's propensity to save. Since this is a property that holds for a closed
economy with a single class of savers, it merely verifies, in the model here, that South
eventually behaves as though it were closed if savings in North is sufficiently low.
While these conclusions follow immediately from the two-class literature, that
literature does not answer all of the questions one might wish to ask about he two country
model. How, for example, do growth rates in the two countries separately depend upon
7The model will be formulated through most of the paper in terms of constant
propensities to save out of income. In section V, however, I will discuss briefly how the
model would behave with a form of rational saving instead.
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their savings propensities and population growth rates? What influence does the ability to
invest savings internationally have on per capita consumption in the two countries? Such
questions have not been considered in the two-class literature because of the omission from
the two-class model of any reference to the population of the capitalist class.8 Yet the
answers to these questions are interesting, as I may indicate by listing the results that I
will derive in later sections of this paper:
Proposition 1. The steady-state of the model divides into three cases, according to the
relative size of the savings propensity in North. In Case I, with a low savings
propensity, North grows only as fast as its own population growth rate and thus
remains small relative to South. In Case II, with a somewhat higher savings
propensity, North grows more rapidly than its own population forever, but
nonetheless continues to own only a negligible share of world capital. In Case III,
with an even higher savings propensity, North grows as rapidly as population in
South, and North also owns a significant share of world capital.
Proposition 2. North can, by changing its savings propensity, affect its own steady-state
growth rate within the limits imposed by the two population growth rates.
Proposition 3. Steady-state per capita consumption in South is unaffected by the savings
propensity of North in Cases I and II, and increases with that savings propensity in
Case III.
Proposition 4. Per capita consumption in North approaches a constant steady-state level
only in Case I. In Cases II and II, per capita consumption in North grows
exponentially forever, with a rate of exponential growth that increases with its
8This omission is understandable, considering the original purposes of such
models, since factor returns and shares do not depend, in steady state, on the size or rate
of growth of the capitalist population.
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savings propensity in Case II and remains constant (equal to the difference between
the two population growth rates) in Case III.
These propositions are in striking contrast to the results of early neoclassical
growth models, both of closed and of open economies, and they are much more reminiscent
of the recent literature on growth with economies of scale. Throughout the neoclassical
literature, it has been accepted that a country cannot sustain growth of its income at a
rate greater than its population growth rate, unless there is some form of technical
progress. It follows that it cannot affect that rate of growth through its savings behavior,
unless the rate of technical progress in turn depends in some way on its rate of savings.
Now it appears, in propositions 1 and 2 above, that a country, even with a stationary
constant-returns-to-scale technology, can use investment in a more rapidly growing
economy to sustain growth more rapid than its own population growth rate, and also that
it can influence its growth rate through its savings propensity. The Solow phenomenon
still operates, of course, but it is now the foreign population growth rate that limits a
country's rate of growth. It is clear from Proposition 4 that this has important
implications for the welfare of the country that has this opportunity. Furthermore, the
benefits in terms of per capita consumption that North obtains by investing abroad are not
obtained at the expense of South, as is clear in Proposition 3.
In subsequent sections of this paper I will present the model more formally and
prove the foregoing propositions. I will also indicate the dividing lines that separate the
three cases. The model I use for this purpose is a simplified version of Kemp's (1969,
Chap. 11) model of trade, investment, and growth. I simplify his model considerably,
however, by abstracting from trade and assuming that there is only one good, which is
produced everywhere in the world. This simplification makes the extension of the model to
countries with different population growth rates more manageable.
In Section II I begin by analyzing growth of a small economy with mobile capital.
A small economy is one whose shares of both world labor and world capital are negligible,
- w
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so that it faces a rate of return to capital that is given from outside. It therefore may
correspond to either of Cases I and II mentioned earlier. In Section III I present the more
general two-country model and derive its asymptotic properties. Sections II and III, then,
will complete the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. In Section IV I turn to the behavior of
consumption in the two countries, proving Propositions 3 and 4. Finally, in Section V, I
discuss the possibility of extending the model by introducing trade, by assuming capital to
be less-than-perfectly mobile, by adding additional countries, by altering the savings
assumption, and by allowing for nontraded goods.
This model is primarily intended as a description of the growth of countries with
internationally mobile capital. It is, however, formally identical to a two-class model of a
single economy, and it has straightforward implications for the origin and behavior of the
classes in such a model. I discuss these implications in section VI.
II. The Small Country Case
Consider first the growth of a small country that has access to a large
international capital market. By abstracting from trade, this model becomes a
modification of Solow's (1956) growth model of a closed one-sector economy. The
modification, of course, is to include as income its earnings on capital invested abroad.
I make the familiar neoclassical assumptions that gross investment equals
savings, that savings is a constant fraction, s, of income, and that the labor force grows
exponentially at a constant rate n. With these assumptions the country's dynamic
behavior is described by the following pair of differential equations:
(1) dL/dt = nL
(2) dK/dt = s[wL+rK] ,
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where K and L are the country's labor force and capital stock respectively.9
The bracketed expression in (2) is the country's income. Note that (2) does not
distinguish between capital invested domestically and capital invested abroad. This will be
appropriate if there are perfect domestic factor markets. This assumption, together with a
linearly homogeneous production function for domestic output, also allows w to be uniquely
determined by r. Thus both w and r are parameters given by the rest of the world.
The system (1,2) reduces to a single differential equation in the capital-labor
ratio, k = K/L.
(3) dk/dt = s[w + rk] -nk
The behavior of this differential equation is easily seen in Figure 1, which is largely
familiar from expositions of the Solow closed economy growth model. f(k) is the production
function in intensive form. Given r, enough capital per head will be employed at home, ke,
to equate f'(ke)=r, and the economy's per capita income, y - including income from
capital invested abroad - is the straight line tangent to f(k) with slope r. Per capita
savings, which is the first term on the right-hand-side of (3), is the fraction of this line, sy,
and need only be compared to a ray from the origin, nk, to determine where k is rising,
falling, or stationary over time.
For the value of n shown, this means that k is driven over time toward the steady
state level, k*. The only difference from the Solow model in this case is a slightly higher
steady-state capital-labor ratio (compare the intersection of nk with the curve sf(k), which
would be per capita savings in a closed economy) and the fact that the country invests
k* - ke" of its capital abroad.1 0 In this case, the model retains the important
9Capital does not depreciate here, though a constant rate of depreciation could be
incorporated without substantively altering the results.
io0f course, for higher n or lower s, steady state would be to the left of ke and
the country would import capital.
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characteristics of Solow's closed-economy growth model. The growth rates of capital and
income both ultimately converge to the population growth rate, n, and there is no
sustained growth of the economy in per capita terms. This corresponds to Case I
mentioned in Proposition 1 of the introduction.
For other parameters, however, the result can be quite different. Consider the
lower population growth rate, n'. In this case, n'k does not intersect sy and the economy
accumulates capital without bound. There is no steady state, in the usual sense of a
constant capital-labor ratio. But the model does possess well-defined asymptotic
properties. To see this, solve equation (3) explicitly as follows:
(4) k(t) = (k0 -k*) exp[(sr-n)t] + k*
where k0 is the initial capital-labor ratio, and
(5) k* -sw
sr-n
The behavior of this solution clearly depends on the expression (sr-n). If s < n/r,
then the exponential term in (4) disappears over time, and the economy converges to k*.
This is Case I as just described.
The rate n' in Figure 1, on the other hand, corresponds to the more interesting
case where r and s are large enough to make (sr-n) > 0. In that case k must grow
indefinitely, and it is the constant term in (4), k*, that becomes insignificant. The term
(sr - n) is now the asymptotic rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio. It follows that sr is
the asymptotic rate of growth of both capital and income - the latter since the wage
component of income becomes insignificant.
It is here then - in what I called Case II in the introduction - that this growth
model exhibits behavior that is radically different from traditional neoclassical models.
Not only is it possible for a country to grow indefinitely at a rate greater than its
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population growth rate, but it can also increase this rate of growth by increasing its
savings propensity. The reason for this, of course, is that the country is freed, by the
international capital market, from the constraint of diminishing returns. In a completely
closed economy with constant returns to scale, the productivity of capital is limited by its
own labor force, and diminishing returns prevent the economy from increasing its capital-
labor ratio indefinitely. In this small country model, on the other hand, the return to
capital that it can earn by investing abroad is constant.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the small-country assumption of this
model can possibly be valid. In the asymptotic solution the small country invests an ever
increasing fraction of its ever increasing capital stock abroad. Is it possible for the rest of
the world to absorb this much capital without it affecting the rate of return? If population
abroad grows no more rapidly than at home, then the answer must certainly be no. For
then the small country's capital stock would be growing faster than world population, and
diminishing returns would have to set in just as in a closed economy.
But if the population growth rate is higher abroad than at home, then the smaller
country can increase its capital stock faster than its own population and rely on the more
rapid population growth in the rest of the world to keep the return to capital from falling.
This possibility is explored further in the next section.
III. The Two-Country Case
In the two-country model the behavioral assumptions for each country are the
same as those used for the small country in Section II. The return to capital and the wage
rate, however, are determined by factor productivities in the two countries, together with
the condition that the return to capital be the same in both.
Let the two countries have identical linearly homogeneous production functions, so
that the average product of labor in both is a function, f, only of the capital-labor ratio
employed. With competitive factor pricing and perfect capital mobility, it follows that the
ratios of capital to labor employed in each country will equal the world capital-labor ratio.
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The competitive return to capital then depends only on the world capital-labor ratio,
KiL, 1 1
(6) r = f(K/L),
as does the competitive wage
(7) w = f(K/L) - rK/L .
The dynamic equations of the two-country case consist of equations (1) and (2) of
Section II, repeated for each country:
(8) dLi/dt = niL i=1,2
(9) dKi/dt = si[wLi +rKi] i=1,2 .
Ki, of course, is the capital owned by country i, not the capital installed in that country.
Notice that there may be different population growth rates, ni, as well as different savings
propensities, si, in the two countries. In particular, I assume without loss of generality
that
(10) n1 > n2
so that country 1 is South of the introduction.
Equations (8) and (9), with substitution from (6) and (7), form a system of four
differential equations in the four unknowns, K., L., i=1,2. The system is more readily
analyzed, however, by introducing the following new variables.
Let
11Variables without subscripts now pertain to the world, while country variables
will now carry country numbers as subscripts.
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(11) A = L 2/(L 1 +L 2 )
be country 2's share of the world labor force; let
(12) p = K 2 /(L 1 +L 2)
be the ratio of country 2's capital to the world labor force; and let
(13) k = K/L = (K 1 +K 2 )/(L +L 2 )
be the world capital-labor ratio.
The with some manipulation, the system (8-9) becomes
(14) dA/dt = A(1- A)(n 2-n1 )
(15) dp/dt = (s2 r-n1 )p + [s2 w+(n 1 -n2 )PIA
(16) dk/dt = s1 (w+rk) - n1 k + (s 2 -s 1 )rp + [(s2-s1)w + (n1 -n2 )k]A
Since r and w are functions only of k in (6) and (7), the equations (14), (15), and (16) form
a closed system of three differential equations in the three unknowns, A, p, and k.
To see the asymptotic properties of this system, observe first that A must go to
zero over time in (14), since n2 has been assumed less than n1 . Thus, the asymptotic
equations of motion for p and k can be simplified considerably by letting A = 0 in (15) and
(16):
(17) dp/dt = (s2 r-n1 )p
(18) dk/dt = [s1f(k)-n 1k] + (s 2 -s 1 )rp
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This system of two differential equations can be analyzed in terms of the phase diagram
that is derived as the lower quadrant of Figure 2.
First, dp/dt=0 in (17) requires either that p=0 or that s2r=n1 . Since r depends
only on k, the latter fixes a vertical line at a value k* such that s2 f'(k*)=n 1 . This in turn
is identifiable in the upper quadrant by the curve s2 f(k) being parallel to the ray n 1k.
Solution to dk/dt=0 in (18) is more complex, since it involves both k and p.
However, it is easy to anchor the solution along the k-axis, where p=0 and what remains
of (18) is the growth equation of the closed-economy Solow growth model. Thus dk/dt = 0
along the k-axis at k**, where s 1 f(k) crosses n1 k in the upper quadrant:
(19) s1f(k**) = n k*




which rises with k as long as s2 >s1, which I assume. Thus the dk/dt=0 locus in the
lower quadrant of Figure 2 slopes down and to the right, starting at k**, and, if k** <k*,
crosses dp/dt=0 at some value p* >0.
The dynamics of p and k are shown by the arrows, and they lead to convergence
- not necessarily monotonic - to the intersection at (k*,p*).12 This is the Case III
solution described in the introduction. North now comes to own a permanently
nonnegligible share of world capital, even though -North's share of world labor, A, goes to
zero. Since p = K2 /(L + L2) becomes a positive constant, K 2 must grow asymptotically
at the same rate as world population, n1 .
12The stability of this dynamic process will be discussed further below.
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An important property of this Case III solution is that, while p depends on s1, k*
does not. Thus r and w, which depend only on k, are also independent of s1 in the Case III
steady state. This is clear directly from (18), where dp/dt=0 is consistent with a positive
solution for p only if r=n1 /s 2 . And this is the familiar result mentioned earlier from two-
class growth models, and known as the Pasinetti Paradox. Indeed this model is formally
identical to the two-class model, since North's low population growth rate drives its share
of labor income to zero, and thus it acts as if it earned only profits.
The Case III solution shown in Figure 2 for the growth rate n1 arises only
because k* * <k*, so that the two curves do intersect at strictly positive p. If they do not
- as shown by the larger k**' implied by a higher si - then the dynamics of the model
take it to k**' itself, and k* becomes irrelevant.13 In that case the world capital stock is
determined entirely in country 1 as though it were a closed economy, and country 2 can be
in either of the small-country cases, I or II, discussed in Section II.
It is now possible to delineate the bounds on parameters that will give rise to each
of the three cases. Let r* * = f'(k* *) be the rental rate that would arise in country 1 as a
closed economy, and that will arise in Cases I and II if they occur. In section II it was
already observed that Case I requires s2 r* * <n 2 , while Case II requires the opposite.
Now, since k* is defined by f'(k*)=n 1/s 2, it follows that 1
(21) k* k** asn/s2$r**
Thus the three cases arise as follows:
(22) Case I: 2 < n2 Ir**
13Recall that the entire k-axis is also consistent with dp/dt=0. In Case Ill the
point (k**,0) was also a steady-state solution, but it was dynamically unstable.
14Sic k**=f'- l(r**) while k*=f'~ 1(n1 /s2), and f' is monotonically decreasing.
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(23) Case II: n2Ir** < s2 < n1 /r**
(24) Case III: s2 > n 1/r**
With n 1 >n 2 , all that is required for all these cases to be consistent with fractional values
of s2 is that n1 /r** <1. Thus each of the three cases can arise, depending on the values of
the various savings and population growth parameters, as long as r** > n1.15
Since r** is the steady-state return to capital for country 1 as a closed economy,
this condition, r* * > n1 , bears obvious resemblance to the "golden rule" of savings. It is
well known that, in order to maximize its steady-state per capita consumption, a closed
economy must save enough to set its steady-state return to capital equal to its rate of
population growth. That is, golden rule savings by country 1 will yield r* * = n 1. If
country 1 fails to follow the golden rule, presumably by saving less than the rule indicates,
then it will indeed be true that r** > n1 , and Case III will be possible for values of s2 less
than unity.
IV. Consumption
The analysis so far shows that a country can benefit considerably, in terms of its
rate of growth of income, by investing in a second country with a more rapidly growing
population. The role of the foreign population is that its rapid growth keeps the return to
capital from falling. It is natural to wonder, in view of this result, about the effects that
this international investment may have on the welfare of the two countries, and
particularly on the welfare of the host country, South. While a general intertemporal
examination of welfare in this model would be beyond the scope of this paper, it is fairly
15The importance of each case also depends on the solution being dynamically
stable. Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) have proved both local stability of the Pasinetti
equilibrium (my Case Ill) and global stability of their "dual" equilibrium (my Cases I and
II). In addition, Guha (1972) has proved global stability of the Pasinetti equilibrium if the
elasticity of factor substitution is greater than 1/2.
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easy to generate conclusions about the asymptotic behavior of per capita consumption in
the two countries.
These problems have simple solutions in Cases I and II. In these cases, country
2's share of world capital, p/k, is asymptotically zero. Factor prices are then completely
determined by the parameters of country 1 and are the same as would prevail if country 1
were closed to foreign investment. It follows that steady-state per capita consumption in
country 1 is completely unaffected by country 2's investment in it.
This is true even though consumption in country 2 itself does depend importantly
on its ability to invest abroad. Steady-state per capita consumption in country 2 as long
as it remains small (Cases I and II) can be identified simply in Figure 1 as the vertical
distance between its per capita income, y2 , and the amount of savings it needs for steady-
state growth, n2 k2 . Evidently, an increase in s2 raises the steady-state capital-labor ratio
in Case I and increases per capita consumption as long as the slope of y2 , which is
determined as r* * in country 1, is larger than n2 . Assuming as just discussed that
savings in country 1 is no more than the golden rule, r** > n1 . Together with n1 > n2 ,
this assures that country 2 increases its steady-state per capita consumption in Case I by
saving more.
In Case II, country 2's per capita savings grows asymptotically at an exponential
rate that equals its rate of accumulation of capital per capita, s2 r* * - n2 . In this case an
increase in s2 causes a short-run fall in per capita consumption, as more is saved out of
the current income, but this drop is followed by a rise in the exponential rate of growth.
Thus increased savings in country 2 has an even greater positive effect on per capita
consumption in Case II than in Case I.
The rate of growth of per capita consumption in country 2 can not be increased
without bound, however. When s2 crosses the dividing line n1Ir**, the system passes.
from Case II into Case III. At that point per capita consumption in country 2 is growing
at the rate (n1-n2). Once s2 is greater than n1Ir**, country 2's capital stock grows at the
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rate n1 regardless of s2. Thus, its capital-labor ratio and its per capita consumption both
grow at the rate (n1 -n2), and this growth rate is unaffected by further increases in s2'
In Case III, though, country 2 owns a positive fraction of the world's capital
stock, virtually all of which is located in country 1. One might therefore expect per capita
consumption in the host country 1 to be adversely affected by increases in s2, since such
increases cause country 2 to own a larger share of world capital. This is not true,
however, as can easily be verified.
In Case III, country 1's capital-labor ratio approaches a constant value, k* - p
Thus it behaves like a country in Case I that is an importer of capital rather than an
exporter. The constancy of its capital-labor ratio implies, from an equation analogous to
(3), that
(25) s1 y1 = n1k 1
Solving for y1, per capita consumption in country 1 is
(26) c1 = (1-s 1 )y1 = (1-s 1 )n1 k1/s1
which therefore depends positively on k1 . But it is easily seen from Figure 1 that a Case I
country that imports capital in steady state must increase its own capital-labor ratio when
r falls. Since a rise in s2 in Case III causes k* to rise and therefore r* to fall in Figure 2,
it follows that steady-state c 1 rises with s2. Thus, while it is true that country 2 benefits
from investing in the foreign country with abundant labor, it is not true that it benefits at
the expense of that country.
It should be stressed that these conclusions about per capita consumption,
verifying Propositions 3 and 4 of Section I, do not constitute a complete treatment of the
welfare implications of international investment. I have looked here only at steady-state
per capita consumption, and I have therefore completely ignored any effects on per capita
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consumption during the approach to steady state. Furthermore, by looking only at per
capita consumption, one misses entirely those side effects of direct investment that are
often cited in arguments for and against it but that either are noneconomic or do not fit
conveniently into the model.16 Note, however, that this model does suggest that these
side effects may not be too important if they depend upon substantial foreign ownership of
a country's installed capital stock. Country 2 does not need to own a substantial portion of
Country 1's installed capital in order to benefit from direct investment. On the contrary,
increased savings by country 2 can increase its rate of growth only so long as it does not
own a positive fraction of world capital.
V. Extensions of the Model
The purpose of this paper has been to examine several implications of two
assumptions: that populations grow at different rates in different countries, and that
capital is mobile between countries. To do this I have used a very simple growth model
that is intended to bring out the significance of these assumptions most clearly. This
exercise would be of little value, however, if the results actually depended on the simplicity
of the model, rather than on the assumptions about capital mobility and population
growth. In this section, therefore, I discuss briefly several of these simplifying
assumptions and the likelihood that they contribute to the results.
Trade
One noticeable drawback of the model is that it does not explicitly include trade in
goods. The single good produced in both countries does flow between them - as it must to
keep payments balanced in the presence of capital flows and income on international
investment - but since there is only one good there can be no commodity trade in the
usual sense. It seems unlikely, however, that the inclusion of trade in the model would
16These side effects include loss of political or cultural autonomy by the country
receiving capital, possible employment effects in the two countries, and the role of
international investment as a means of transmitting technology.
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significantly alter the results. The inclusion of trade would be most easily accomplished by
having two sectors, one producing consumption goods and the other producing investment
goods. The model would then be formally identical to Stiglitz's (1967) two-sector two-class
growth model. Stiglitz found much the same kinds of growth behavior that Samuelson and
Modigliani (1966) had found in the one-sector model, except that he found local instability
possible for the Pasinetti-type equilibrium (analogous to Case III).
Of course, Stiglitz did not examine trade in goods between his classes (countries).
But Kemp's (1969) analysis of growth with trade and capital mobility suggests that not
much would have been learned had he done so, since the location of capital, and therefore
the pattern of trade, are indeterminate in such a model.
Finally, the model here of the small country case, as presented in Section II, did
not actually use the one-sector assumption. Equations (1-5) continue to be valid with any
number of sectors so long as the country remains too small to influence the given factor
prices. Since the small country exhibited, in Case II, the most striking results (i.e., a
growth rate larger than n and subject to change through s) it seems unlikely that the other
propositions would fail either with the inclusion of trade.
More than Two Countries
A second drawback of the model is that it includes only two countries. This is
easily rectified. The equations of the model are the same as equations (6)-(9), except that
equations (8) and (9) now extend over i =1,...,m, where m is the number of countries.
Also, of course, K and L are now defined as the sums of the respective Ki and Li over all
m countries as well.
Assume that the countries are numbered in decreasing order of their population
growth rates,
(2 7) n( > n2 _n 3 ... nm
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where country 1 is assumed to have a strictly higher population growth rate than any
other country. 1 As before, it is convenient to transform the variables of the model to
world per capita terms, A. = L/L andp. = K/L. The time path of A. can then be expressed,
from (8), as
dA.
(28) = = (n - n)A
where
m-1dL
(29) n = S An
j=1jj Ldt
is the rate of growth of world population and varies over time. While it is no longer the
case that all of these Ai's must evolve monotonically, it is still true that all of them except
A 1 must move asymptotically toward zero. 1 Thus
(30) lim A 1 = 1
t-+oo
and
(31) lim n = n1
t-+oo
Differentiating pi and using (9)
17If two or more countries tie for having the highest population growth rate, then
they can be aggregated into a single country. If they have different savings rates among
them, however, the aggregate will behave like a two-class economy and the analysis will
be somewhat more complicated than appears here.
1This follows since all A. for which n. <n do converge to zero. In doing so, their
weights in n fall to zero, eventually forcing the A. for all other i> 1 to also have n. <n.
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1(33) ~ ~ .
i=1
Using (30) and (31), these become
pin
(34) lim dk [s f(k)
t-cx dt
m
nyk] + f'(k) (s - si)p
i=2
dp
(35) limd = [s.f'(k) - n ] p
t~oodt 1 -n1p t9=2,...,m
From (35) one can show that only the country with the highest19 savings
propensity among countries 2,...,m can maintain a positive share of world capital in the
long run.20
As a benchmark, let k. be the world capital-labor ratio that would yield a return
on capital just sufficient to keep country i's value of pi constant in the long run:
* -1 n(36) k. =f' -
1 si!
Then it is easily seen that
19Again, if more than one of countries 2,...,m share the same highest savings
ratio, then these countries could be aggregated for the purpose of the long-run analysis.
For simplicity though I will assume that such ties do not occur.




(37) lim k ? k.
t-oo
i=2,...,n-
since otherwise pi for any i that violates (37) would eventually, from (35), grow to exceed
k. Noting that k. is positively related to si, it follows that the world capital-labor ratio
converges to a value that is at least as high (and hence r to a value that is at least as low)
as would be needed to sustain a constant value of pi in the highest saving country among
2,...,m - call it country i. Therefore all others of these countries must asymptotically find
sif'(k) < n1 in (35) and their pi go to zero:
(38) lim pi = 0 for i 1, i
t-+oo
where
(39) sg ?si for i = 2,...,m .
Thus in the long run, the m-country model reduces to the 2-country case. Only
country 1 owns an asymptotically positive share of world labor, and only country 1
together with the highest saving of the other countries, country I, own asymptotically
positive shares of world capital. All other countries disappear, in terms of their
importance to the world system. Of course each of them continues to be of interest to its
own residents, and their behavior can still be described by the analysis in section II of the
small-country case.
Imperfect Capital Mobility
A third possible drawback of the model is that a desirable assumption - that
capital is mobile - takes the extreme form that capital is perfectly mobile. Perfect
mobility of capital is certainly not realistic, but it is probably a reasonable approximation
to reality for the long-run problems of this paper. For if capital is mobile at all, then it
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should move in response to inter-country differentials in its rate of return. In the long run,
such capital movements, even if they occur only slowly, should bring about some fixed
relationship between returns to capital in different countries. Such a fixed relationship is
really all that is needed for the qualitative results of this paper.
Alternative Savings Behavior
A fourth drawback of the model is the simplicity of the savings assumption. A
constant savings propensity, though it is a staple of the early growth literature, is not
easily justified by any sort of optimization.2 2 The advantage of the constant savings
propensity therefore is primarily expositional, and the fact that it permits discussion of
what alternative levels of savings may imply, as opposed to what levels of savings are
most likely to occur.
Still it is reasonable to ask whether the behavior described here could still arise if
savings were a matter of choice. One step in this direction would be to let the savings rate
be a function of the interest rate, r, and perhaps also of the wage and the per capita
capital stock. Since all of these variables depend on the capital-labor ratio, the effect of
such assumptions would be to alter the shapes of the curves labelled sf in Figures 1 and 2.
Certain problems of nonuniqueness could arise if a savings rate were to rise or to fluctuate
with increases in a capital-labor ratio. But otherwise the analysis should not be much
affected. For example, if country 2 saves enough more than country 1 for any particular
value of the interest rate, then cases like II and III will still be possible.
2 1In Deardorff (1987) I have examined a numerical simulation model based upon
the structure of the model presented here, but with imperfectly mobile capital. While for
the particular parameters used there only the Case I solution arises, experimentation with
the model outside of the paper confirmed that the other cases could arise as well and that
the model with imperfect capital mobility behaved essentially the same as the model here.
22Kurz (1968) was able to construct an intertemporal utility function for which a
constant savings propensity would be optimal in the Solow growth model, but it is not clear
that the same could be done here, especially if the same savings propensities are to.
continue to be optimal for alternative values of other parameters.
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To go further toward a complete optimizing model of saving is also possible,
though tractable models tend to lead to conclusions in this context that I regard as
somewhat extreme. For example, suppose that savers in both countries attempt to
maximize the following simple intertemporal utility function:
-6.t y.
(40) Ui = e 1 [ci(t)] /ydt
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where 6. is the time discount rate of consumers in country i and y is a parameter such
that y < 1.23 Maximizing subject to an intertemporal budget constraint with constant
(steady-state) values of r and w leads to an optimal consumption path,
(41) ci(t) = c0 exp{[(r-65-ni)/(1-yi)]t}
Incorporating this behavior into the model of this paper, and letting n1 > n2 , it is
not difficult to get the Case II steady-state solution. In this case r is set equal to 61 + n1,
so that per capita consumption is constant in country 1 and per capita consumption in
country 2 therefore grows exponentially at the rate (61-62+n1 -n 2)I(1- y2)' I
(42) 62 < 65 + (n1-n2)
this rate of growth will be positive, while if
(43) 62 > 61 + y2(n -n2
it will be less than n1-n2 , keeping country 2's capital stock a negligible fraction of the
world's.
23An alternative approach to an intertemporal optimizing model would be to use
an overlapping generations model, as in Buiter (1981). In such a model however, unless
there are bequests, the capital stock must be acquired anew each period out of labor
income and therefore cannot grow indefinitely faster than population.
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Cases I and III also arise with this optimizing behavior, but they take a different
form. In Case I, where (42) holds with the reverse strict inequality, per capita
consumption falls asymptotically over time toward zero in country 2. Similarly in Case
III, where (43) holds with the reverse strict inequality, if a solution exists, per capita
consumption in country 1 declines toward zero. In this case, r is set as follows to yield a
growth rate of per capita consumption of n 1 -n 2 in country 2,
(44) r = 62 + n2 + (1-7 2)(n1 -n2)
and country 1 actually ends up acquiring a debt to country 2 which it services using the
wages earned by its labor. Also, if r in (44) is lower even than n1 , then no solution exists,
since the present value of 1's labor income against which it could borrow from country 2 is
undefined. Apparently in such a case the discount and population growth rates are so
different in the two countries that they each would try to shift their consumption infinitely
into the present or the future.
This behavior is sufficiently odd that I do not find it credible, and I have therefore
chosen not to make such an optimizing model the basis for my analysis. I suspect that a
more sophisticated optimizing model, one with a more general functional relating utility
and the time path of consumption, would not have to lead to these difficulties. 2 4 Whether
such a model would also replicate the qualitative features of my Cases I, II, and III
remains to be seen.
Nontraded Goods
I have not allowed as yet for nontraded goods, which might seem to pose serious
problems for the main conclusions of my analysis. After all, if per capita income in a
240ne possibility, suggested to me by Jon Eaton, would be to make the
instantaneous discount rate depend positively on instantaneous utility, in the manner of
Uzawa (1968). By also having an upper bound on this discount rate, one can get a Case
III solution in which country 2's per capita consumption grows exponentially but country
1's declines to a constant positive level.
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country grows without bound, then demand for any nontraded goods will presumably also
grow, putting increasing pressure on the domestic resources needed to produce them. One
might expect therefore that the need to produce nontraded goods would ultimately place
even a high-saving country back in the trap of zero per capita growth. By merely
sketching how a nontraded good could fit into my analysis, I will argue that this is not the
case, except in the most extreme of circumstances.
Suppose then that, in addition to the traded good discussed so far, there is a
nontraded good that also must be produced using capital and labor through a neoclassical
production function. Let the two goods together enter as arguments into an instantaneous
per capita utility function.
Presence of the nontraded good poses no difficulty for as long as the traded good
continues to be produced in the country. For then the price of the traded good and the
rental on capital that are given on the world market will serve to determine the wage
within the traded-good industry. The wage and rental together will then determine the
price of the nontraded good and, together with income, the demand for it. The wage and
rental also determine the capital-labor ratio and the labor-output ratio in the nontraded
good industry. Therefore, as long as there is enough labor in the country to satisfy
demand at this labor-output ratio and still have something left over for production of the
traded good, the traded and nontraded goods can be aggregated and treated collectively
very much like the one-sector economy earlier in the paper.25
However, in anything but Case I above, per capita income grows without bound
and the demand for the nontraded good, if it is a normal good, will grow without bound as
well.2 Eventually, then, it will surpass what can be produced with the available labor,
25Note that only labor provides a constraint on producing the nontraded good,
since capital can be obtained from abroad.
2 6Strictly speaking, a positive but declining income elasticity of demand is
consistent with a demand that grows indefinitely but nonetheless approaches a finite upper
limit. I will ignore this possibility, as well as the possibility of a zero or negative income
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and production of the traded good will cease. From then on, if the country continues to
grow, all consumption of the traded good will be obtained from abroad in exchange for the
earnings on capital, which have been invested abroad and which have permitted income to
increase in the first place. At the same time, production of the nontraded good will employ
increasing amounts of capital per worker, increasing the wage but also the price of the
nontraded good relative to the traded good. From this point on, the growing economy is
once again a one-sector economy in terms of production, but it consumes an additional good
that it only imports.
Such an economy will not in general settle into anything like a steady state, since
the price of the nontraded good will be continually increasing and consumers will be
continually substituting away from it in favor of the traded good. If a steady state were
possible, it would require that this rate of substitution be somehow constant over time, and
this would surely require an overly restrictive assumption about both the utility function
and the production function for the nontraded good.
Rather than attempt to solve such a model explicitly, therefore, I will merely ask
whether the presence of the nontraded good will make unbounded growth, such as was
found earlier in the paper, impossible. It might seem at first that it would. After all, if
traded and nontraded goods were perfect substitutes, then the presence of the nontraded
good could not pose a problem, since the two could again be aggregated and the model
would behave as before. So in the opposite extreme it might appear that if they were
perfect complements instead, then, because it would be impossible to substitute away from
the nontraded good at all, the limits on producing it would eventually become limits on
growth itself.
This is not the case, however. Even if substitution were impossible in both
consumption and production, it would still be possible to increase production of the
elasticity, since in any case they would make my main results easier, not harder, to
obtain.
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nontraded good in proportion to the growth of population. Thus it is never necessary to
reduce per capita consumption of the nontraded good. Then if any substitution in
consumption is possible at all-that is, as long as utility continues to increase in
consumption of the traded good for any given level of consumption of the nontraded good-
then per capita utility will be able to rise indefinitely.
Only in the very extreme case of absolutely no substitution in consumption (thus
L-shaped indifference curves) will the presence of nontraded goods choke off per capita
growth completely. In that case-since utility is then constrained by the per capita
availability of the nontraded good and since that availability is in turn limited by
diminishing returns and the need to invest to keep up with population growth, just as in
the closed economy growth model-then the presence of a nontraded good would undermine
the main result of this paper. Such a country would be unable to sustain per capita
growth just by investing its savings abroad, for the return on that saving would only buy it
the traded good and it eventually reaches the point where additional consumption of the
traded good does not add to utility.
However, in what is surely the more normal case, some substitution between
traded and nontraded goods is possible. In that case, a country with a low population
growth rate can once again increase its per capita utility without bound by investing its
savings on the world market. As its income rises, its consumption will include an
increasing proportion of traded goods, as well as either an increasing or a decreasing per
capita quantity of the nontraded good depending on how much substitution is possible. In
either case, the wage of labor, the price of the nontraded good, and the utility of the
individual consumer, will all rise without bound as growth proceeds.2 7
27Unlike earlier in the paper, I have discussed growth here in terms of utility,
rather than income or consumption. This is necessary since there are now two goods, the
price of which are changing.
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VI. Implications for Two-Class Growth Models
I already noted the fact that my model is formally identical to a two-class growth
model of a closed economy. Thus by simply replacing the word "country" with "class"
throughout the preceding sections, one can reinterpret the results as properties of a two-
class model.
The most important, and also the simplest, implication of applying this model to a
two-class economy is its interpretation of the meaning of classes. When Pasinetti (1962,
p. 272) introduced the two-class model, he defined the capitalist class as "a category of
individuals who - owing to the position they occupy in the production process - derive all
their incomes . . . exclusively from profits . . ." The model here shows, however, that the
special role that capitalists play in growth depends, not on their earning no labor income at
all, but on their share of total labor income being negligible. This can be the case even if
capitalists as individuals do provide labor, so long as the number of capitalists remains
small compared to the total labor force, due to their lower than average rate of population
growth or reproduction. Thus Samuelson and Modigliani's (1966, p. 297) ". . . difficulty of
identifying a class whose sole source of income is income from capital. . ." may not be so
difficult after all. One needs merely to identify classes that differ in the rates at which
their'populations grow.
There is, of course, a more serious difficulty with the concept of ongoing classes.
This was also noted by Samuelson and Modigliani, and my approach does nothing to
alleviate it. The classes, however they are defined, must maintain their identities and
their ownership of capital from generation to generation. Thus the model breaks down if
capital is transferred from one class to another when individuals or their descendants
change classes. This objection to the two-class model applies as well to my two-country
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version, though it is surely less serious in the two-country case, to the extent that
international migration is limited.2 8
Finally, my model of a two-class economy also yields an interesting and
disturbing implication for the distribution of income between classes. From Proposition 1 it
follows that, if the capitalists' propensity to save is large enough, then the capitalists will
enjoy an ever increasing per capita income, while the per capita income of workers
remains constant. Thus per capita income inequality between classes grows
indefinitely.2 Applied, again, in the international context, the implication of ever-
increasing international income inequality is equally disturbing.
2 80n the other hand, even a large amount of labor migration would be consistent
with my model if the migrants typically take no capital with them.
2 9This result may be compared to those of Stiglitz (1969) who examined a variety
of sources both of equality and of inequality, in the distribution of income and wealth.
While Stiglitz did consider, separately, differences in both reproduction and savings rates
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Suppose for purpose of contradiction that for any i> 1 there exists k0 and t 0 such that
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1- = sf'(k) - n 1 >sif'(k0) - n 1 > sif'(k ) = 0
for all t>to
It follows that p1 would grow without bound after time t0 , eventually surpassing k itself.
This is impossible, since k = p and all p ?0. Thus by contradiction it follows that
(A5)
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Thus for all i such that 1 < i * 1, for which therefore si < s, it follows that
(A10)
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